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Foreword 
This paper was stimulated by a striking discrepancy which exists between the frequency with 
which the concept of potential output is dealt with in every basic macroeconomic textbook 
and nearly complete absence of any comprehension of what might have happened to potential 
output in economies in transition. Although the search for this macroeconomic pivotal point 
may look like solving an intellectual puzzle, the real challenge lies in implications of changes 
in potential output for effective policy-making during the transformation period. This paper 
points out some weaknesses of applying standard macroeconomic concepts (like Okun's law) 
and illuminates the necessity of using indirect and mezzo-economic approaches. Despite the 
difficulty of making a new definition of potential output operational, this paper suggests the 
usefulness of introducing a kind of transformation bridge which should methodologically 
facilitate understanding the concept of potential output when moving from a centrally planned 
economy to a market one. 
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Motto: 
Give me but one firm spot on which to 
stand, and I will move the earth. 
Archimedes 
1. Introduction 
According to a simplified mainstream macroeconomic textbook wisdom, the danger of 
inflation arises whenever an economy approaches or operates on (or even behind) its 
production possibility frontier (which corresponds to its potential output) and retreats 
whenever an economy records a noticeable GNP-gap, other things being equal. This regularity 
is usually explained by the rate of utilization and resulting availability of scarce production 
factors and illustrated by a relatively flat short-run supply curve in the region below the 
potential output and rather steep short-run supply curve in the region above the level of 
potential output. Aggregate demand management (with a temporarily fixed potential output 
and short-run aggregate supply) then results either in a substantial change of output and a 
small change in price level (or inflation) - when production capacities are under-utilized - or 
alternatively in unimportant output changes and considerable changes in price level (inflation) 
- when the economy uses its production resources "fully" or more than "fully". Potential 
output thus becomes a pivotal point of crucial macroeconomic importance. 
The task of determining potential output is far from being simple, unequivocal and 
unbiased. There is no unique definition of potential output. The concept is defined in several 
alternative ways which reflect different methodological stand-points of individual authors, 
accumulated knowledge in this area, availability of statistical data, etc. Despite various 
shortcomings, limitations and arbitrariness of different definitions and methods the concept 
itself could still be considered as one of conceivable and useful benchmarks of macroeco- 
nomic performance both with respect to the short- and medium-run stabilization issues and 
with respect to the long-run economic growth. It serves as a valuable analytical tool for 
deeper insights into important underlying economic proce~ses.~ 
' I would like to thank JBnos GBcs for his valuable comments to the earlier draft of this 
paper and also to Mojmir HBjek and Vladimir BenBEek for inspiring suggestions to certain 
points. Errors and omissions are my own. 
Potential output, as one of many useful indicators in macroeconomic analysis, can be 
used, for example, as a yardstick for the interpretation and formulation of fiscal policy. The 
concepts of "full employment surplus" or "cyclically adjusted deficits" are utilized in fiscal 
policy investigations. 
The usefulness of the concept of potential output consists in the fact that the 
information on potential production possibilities provides a more precise identification of the 
gravitation trend for actual output oscillations during business cycles. This is because the 
concept enables to define a distinction between changes in the economy's capacity to produce 
and changes in the extent to which that capacity is used. By quantifying the potential output 
in relation to actual output we receive a more reliable picture of the current state of 
macroeconomic affairs which helps us to develop more accurate predictions of impacts of 
possible external or policy shocks. By the same token, policy makers should be in a better 
position to devise more appropriate policy responses to cure the unwanted excesses in 
macroeconomic performance. In other words, if steady growth of output and stable prices are 
the social and policy goals, the information of the production possibility of the country sheds 
light on the task of how the desirable combination of both can be attained effectively. The 
wider is the GNP-gap without being noticed, the more important is this kind of knowledge 
for good policy-making having more rewarding outcomes for the population. In this regard, 
potential output contains implicitly even certain normative features. 
A specific importance of the concept of potential output arises when we try to identify 
the reasons of contemporary recessions in transforming countries. Many explanations ranging 
from external causes (collapse of CMEA trade, etc.) to reform-induced (temporary loss of 
coordination mechanisms, etc.) or self-inflicted causes (mistaken policies) seem to lack an 
anchor, which is the recognition of the ability of these economies to produce under altering 
conditions during economic reforms3 It is crucial to address the question whether this ability 
was changed at all during recent years and if so in what way and what factors stayed behind 
this change. It is unquestionable that the current performance (measured by GDP) of 
economies in transition is much lower than four years ago but we would like to discover to 
what extent is this decline a result of overall decreased ability of economies to produce and 
to what extent it is just the actual output deviation from their long run production trend. This 
issue is outlined in the Figure I. 
The stylized facts show that the economies during their transition periods shifted in 
the slumpflationary direction from the point E (year 1989) to E' (1992) displaying simulta- 
neously output decline and price level increase. Disregarding the fact that the economies could 
had been in significant macroeconomic disequilibria in both (or even all) years and assuming 
that former socialist economies worked on (or near) their production possibility frontier4 we 
would like to focus on the movement of the potential output line. Two extreme cases are 
portrayed. While on the left-hand panel the potential output did not change at all and the 
short-run equilibrium shifted far below the level of potential output (causing thus a substantial 
GNP-gap) on the right-hand panel potential output followed the path of actual output (and 
Similarly, wide-spread, politically-colored, and heated public discussions about "the 
necessity" (reformers) or alternatively "the excessiveness" (anti-reformers) of the production 
decline are frequently, alas, based on truly arbitrary statements. I am convinced that without 
knowledge of the potential output development the arguments of both camps are difficult 
either to prove or falsify. No loose judgments can therefore aspire to be real arguments in 
well-meant discussions and remain quite worthless personal views without any explanatory 
or convincing power. 
4 Later on we release this assumption. 
short-run equilibrium) which led to a zero GNP-gap.5 
a) no shift of potential output b) shift of potential output 
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Figure 1 Did Economies in Transition Experience a Shift of Potential Output? 
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It is obvious from Figure 1 that both cases have crucial and quite opposite consequences for 
understanding the nature of current economic decline and for effective macroeconomic 
remedies as well. Indeed, much depends on the shape of and the location on the aggregate 
supply curve. If the left-hand situation is the case, then the economies do not loose the 
production potential inherited from the past and their task consists in its better utilization. Any 
economic policy designed to stimulate growth and overcome the current economic depression 
should be effective (in terms of output) and could be launched without any fears of generating 
inflationary pressures. If the right-hand side story is true, a part of former production 
capacities is lost (at least in the short-run), the existing capacities are utilized (more or less) 
fully, and policy makers cannot expect any substantial gains in terms of output from the 
implementation of expansionary policies: they should be very careful and to avoid any 
temptation to stimulate the economy unless they want to ignite the inflationary spiral. Under 
such conditions, long term economic growth of production possibilities depends more on 
factors like high rate of savings, positive inducement to investment, reasonably focused 
microeconomic policies, etc. 
This paper attempts to apply the concept of potential output on a highly turbulent and 
burdensome object - post-socialist economy in transition to a market economy - using the 
example of the Czech Republic. Section 2 reviews basic or accepted definitions of potential 
output. Section 3 outlines possible ways of applying two methods of estimating potential 
output. Section 4 deals with technological measures of potential output. Section 5 develops 
a methodology which takes into account specific conditions of former socialist economies and 
the transition period as well. While the former are characterized for example by non- 
parametric economic environment, systemic-conditioned wasting of production factors or 
distorted system of economic incentives, for the latter is typically the weak markets, high 
Y*89=Y*92 GNP 
I think that we can reasonably assume that the potential output did not increase during 
three years of transition. 
degree of economic uncertainty, still non-standard behavior of the whole groups of economic 
agents, lack of reliable statistical data, etc. Concepts of technical potential output, systemic- 
conditioned potential output, and economic potential output are introduced and several 
hypotheses about the movement of potential output are suggested. Section 6 presents some 
available statistical evidence which serves for the examination of the above mentioned 
hypothesizes. Section 7 attempts to estimate potential output in industry. Section 8 discusses 
the implication of the potential output analysis for economic policy. The results of the study 
are summarized in the conclusion. 
2. Basic Concepts and Some Approaches 
Estimating the level of potential output6 of a certain country is an intricate task. There are 
many approaches to this issue ranging from simple intuitive guesses to highly sophisticated 
computations using advanced econometric tools. 
The most simple definition of potential product indicates, that this is the level of 
output that would be reached if the economy were using its production resources fully.7 A 
number of questions immediately arises when we start considering the condition "fully". It 
usually refers to a full or normal capital utilization and full, high, or desirable level of labor 
employment. Because these criteria are rather vague and moreover not comprehensive, another 
supplementary condition(s) is (are) usually needed. Most frequently it is the non-inflationary 
utilization of supply capacities. With regard to the introduction of price criterion, the potential 
output is the largest output that could be obtained without inflation. 
Understandably, along with all additional conditions, the necessity of further 
specification emerges: how much inflation could be contemplated as a price stability? What 
is, in fact, the full utilization of capital and labor, and so on. Neither unemployment nor 
inflation rate were precisely formulated in numerous studies and if they were, their designa- 
tion was later on subjected to changes enforced by developing circumstances. As far as the 
utilization of labor is concerned, some researchers suggested that full employment should 
consist of such types of employment (seasonal, structural, frictional) that would not be 
increased much by higher demand - at least not rapidly and not without generating the 
upward pressures on wages and prices. Others identified the unemployment rate corresponding 
to potential conditions as simply one, which is low enough to be generally acceptable. In the 
USA during the 1960s the view prevailed that full employment (very often expressed later 
on in terms of a natural rate of unemployment) is consistent with four percent of unemploy- 
ment. 
This level of unemployment served Arthur Okun as the target rate of labor utilization 
underlying his computation of potential GNP. Okun (1983, p. 148) made an assumption that, 
"whatever the influence of slack economic activity on average hours, labor force participation, 
and man-hour productivity, the magnitudes of all these effects are related to the unemploy- 
ment rate. ... the unemployment rate can be viewed as a proxy variable for all the ways in 
which output is affected by idle resources. The measurement of potential output then is 
simplified into an estimate of how much output is depressed by unemployment in excess of 
This term was invented and introduced by Arthur Okun in 1962 (Okun, 1983). 
As a synonym the term "output at high employment" is sometimes used. 
4 
four percent." Using the post-war quarterly data and three different methods relating output 
to the unemployment rate, Okun developed a kind of transformation between both variables 
which became famous as Okun's law. It states that on average every extra percentage point 
in excess of four percent unemployment decreases the real GNP by 3.2 percentage points 
within the range of 3 to 7.5 percent of the unemployment rate. The relation between potential 
and actual output is then expressed in the equation 
which states that when the unemployment rate (U) is four percent, potential output (P) is 
estimated as equal to actual (A) and when, for example, the unemployment rate is five 
percent, the estimated GNP gap is 3.2 percent of GNP. 
Two remarks deserve attention: 
1) Potential output, not only in Okun's understanding but in general, is a static concept. 
Factors like technological knowledge, capital stock, natural resources, the skill and education 
of the labor force are fixed in the short-run. In the study of the relation between potential and 
actual output in each single individual year they are treated as other things being equal. The 
difference between both variables comes from the movement of aggregate demand. When the 
demand is lower than the level that would lead to four percent of unemployment rate, part 
of the production potential will not be produced. 
2) A two-way street between potential and actual output exists. While the potential output, 
indeed, demarcates the basic space for oscillations of actual output in a given period, the 
extent of resource utilization in a current period determines the development of potential 
output in the next period (Coen, Hickman, 1980). Recessionary periods with unused resources 
in a large scale retard the growth of potential GNP via low profits and personal incomes; low 
investment into plants, equipment, research, and education, etc. Because "today's actual output 
influences tomorrow's productive capacity, success in the stabilization objective promotes 
more rapid economic growth" (Okun, 1983, p. 147). Thus, in contrast with the above 
paragraph, in the medium- and long-run, potential output is a dynamic concept par excellence. 
Four percent of the unemployment rate and 3.2 : 1 "transformation ratio" were 
modified at the end of 1960s. Wide consensus was reached that during 1970s the natural rate 
of unemployment in the US economy increased to five percent and during 1980s even to 6-7 
pe r~en t .~  This upward shift of the full employment target was also reflected in regular 
Presidential Reports. While during 1960s and most of 1970s the Council of Economic 
Advisers considered potential output to be the output that would be obtained if four percent 
of the civilian labor force were unemployed, in the 1979 Economic Report of the President 
The long-run upward shift of the natural rate of unemployment is being associated with 
many factors: increased labor-force participation of teenagers, minorities and women; secular 
growth of humanitarian government policies (unemployment insurance, welfare programs, 
minimum wage legislation, etc.); increase of structural unemployment and some other factors. 
the CEA used 5.1 percent unemployment rate in each of the years from 1975 through 1978.~ 
The turbulent 1970s and 1980s brought into the research of potential output a good 
deal of confusion, disturbing irregularities, and inconsistencies. These were caused by supply 
shocks of different kinds, wild fluctuations of basic macroeconomic variables, changes in 
policy priorities and modifications of broad institutional settings. As a consequence, the 
attitudes of authors diverged and their understanding of the concept became even more 
arbitrary (Denison, 1985). 
In the last 15 years the consensus emerged, that after 1973 an unemployment rate of 
four or five percent would not have been consistent with price stability. Therefore, some 
researchers retain price behavior as a criterion for potential output and refuse the criterion of 
low unemployment. Nevertheless, no attempts seem to be made to measure potential output 
as the largest output reachable under the condition of stable prices. Taken strictly, such a 
figure would be probably very small and would imply such a rate of unemployment which 
would be, because of its excessiveness, of doubtful value either as a policy goal or as an 
analytical tool. 
Because of this inconvenience, a new criterion was introduced at the end of 1970s. It 
regards potential unemployment as the unemployment that would not change the "present" 
rate of inflation, whatever that rate might be, and potential output as the output consistent 
with that unemployment rate. The supporters of this definition had in mind the underlying rate 
of inflation rather than the actual rate of inflation. They attempted to examine conditions 
considered as pertinent to the underlying rate of price change and to eliminate the effect on 
the price level of random influences like upswings of farm prices or oil prices. 
Wild fluctuations of the rate of inflation after 1973 lead us to anticipate similar wide 
fluctuations in potential output and unemployment as far as they are defined as the output and 
unemployment that would keep the present inflation rate unchanged. It is of little doubt that 
estimations would be very sensitive to an interpretation of the term "present". Different 
"present" time periods like "present" month, "present" quarter, or "present" year can produce 
very different results. 
The definition based on stable inflation is far not only from the original idea of 
potential output as the highest output considered with price stability but also from the 
customary meaning attached to the words which was related to supply possibilities and high 
employment. Moreover, the criterion of stable inflation does not provide the basis for a 
valuable time series. With respect to a rather uncertain trade-off between the unemployment 
rate and price changes, a series that would really reflect the criterion of stable inflation would 
be too unstable to be useful. 
Edward Denison defines potential income in 1972 prices in any given year as the 
value, that national income in 1972 prices would have taken if: 
1) unemployment had been at four percent of the civilian labor force being sixteen years of 
age and over; 
2) the intensity of the utilization of resources that were in use had been at the same rate 
The reason behind this modification was the belief that the weighted unemployment rate 
provides a better measure of the tightness of labor markets than the simple unemployment 
rate. The weighted unemployment rate tries to take into account the relative importance of 
unemployment rates in individual demographic groups. 
every year, namely, that which one on the average'' would be associated with a four 
percent unemployment rate; 
3) other conditions had been those that actually prevailed in that year (Denison, 1985, p. 
xxi). 
Point two refers to the relationship between the strength of the demand, intensity of 
utilization, and productivity. According to Denison its importance consists in the fact that the 
output that is obtained is greatly affected not only by the rate of change in output but also 
by the level of unemployment or output. At any unemployment rate, productivity is usually 
much higher, relative to its trend, when output is rising rapidly than when it is stable or 
falling. 
Point three says that the weather, labor disputes, the size of the armed forces, and all 
other conditions except demand are taken to be the same under potential conditions as under 
actual conditions. Many, sometimes erratically changing determinants of output are neither 
the consequences of changes in demand nor controllable by macroeconomic policy. These 
determinants affect both actual and potential output, but not the difference between them. 
Capital stock, according to Denison, deserves special attention because investment is 
correlated with the business cycle. The estimates of potential output are based on the capital 
stock that actually exists in a given year and not on the stock that might have existed if 
investment had been different in previous periods. 
Potential national income in a given year is then obtained by adjusting actual national 
income which takes into consideration the differences between actual and potential conditions. 
There are two main components of this adjustment: 
a) The first eliminates the effect of fluctuations in the level of demand upon output 
per unit of input in non-residential business. The aim is to acquire the output that the 
resources measured as actually in use would have produced under standardized demand 
conditions corresponding to the definition of potential output. 
b) The second component measures the effect on output which stems from the 
difference between actual and potential labor input. The calculation takes into account the 
difference between full-time and part-time, the difference between actual and potential hours 
for each group, the age, sex, and education of workers, and the percentage allocation of 
workers among sectors of the economy. 
One simplification is made that if the unemployment rate had been four percent rather 
than its actual rate, the entire difference in employment would have appeared among non-farm 
wage and salary workers in the business sector. This assumption is made because many kinds 
of unemployment, like for example employment in general government and institutions, are 
not much affected by short-term fluctuations of aggregate demand. A special approach should 
be applied with respect to persons employed on government work relief programs, because 
there would have been no relief programs if unemployment had been at four percent. When 
adjusting actual national income to a potential basis, the value of the output of work relief 
workers is first excluded from general government national income. In the estimation of 
potential output in non-residential business, these workers are considered as if they had been 
unemployed. 
Denison does not find any reason for incorporating price aspects into a definition of 
'O The term "on average" refers to the average of a hypothetical random sample of years 
in which unemployment is four percent but output is changing by the amount larger than, the 
same as, or smaller than the trend rate of change at the time. 
potential output. He agrees with definitions of potential output presented for example in 
January 1977 and January 1979 CEA reports which refer to a high but sustainable utilization 
of the factors of production - labor, capital, and natural resources. Such utilization "does not 
represent the absolute maximal level of production that could be generated by wartime or 
other abnormal levels of aggregate demand, but rather that which could be expected from high 
utilization rates obtainable under more normal circumstances" (Economic Report of the 
President, 1977, p. 52). This definition makes no reference to prices and is based on supply 
capability at high employment. Denison insists on such series of potential output which 
assume or imply no particular price behavior. The unemployment in such potential output 
series ought conceptually to be the seasonal, structural, and frictional unemployment but for 
the sake of simplicity customary four percent could be acceptable. 
Raymond Torres and John Martin (from the OECD Secretariat) consider the potential 
output as the maximum level of output that is consistent over the medium-term with stable 
inflation (Torres and Martin, 1989). The way of definition of this concept arises from the 
emphasis which is being imposed on controlling inflation as a key medium-term priority. A 
consistency between labor market equilibrium and product market equilibrium is assumed. 
The approach rests on an aggregate three-factor production function of a nested CES 
form. This "outer" function contains an "inner" function which combines capital and energy 
into a single aggregate, referred to as the capital-energy bundle. The "outer" production 
function which combines the capital-energy bundle with the labor input measured in 
efficiency units is characterized by: 
1) constant elasticity of factor substitution; 
2) constant returns to scale; and 
3) Harrod-neutral technical progress. 
The specification of the production function is the following: 
QBSV = (P . (ETB . ELEFF)P + a . KEBSVP)("P) 
where 
QBSV is normal output, which represents the output level that would be supplied if the actual 
quantities of capital, labor and energy were used at average utilization rates; 
ETB is actual business-sector employment; 
ELEFF is the labor efficiency index; 
KEBSV is the actual capital-energy bundle; 
p is equal to (r  - l)lr, where r is the elasticity of substitution in the "outer" function 
between labor and the capital-energy bundle; P and a are scale parameters. 
Potential output in the business-sector is defined as follows: 
potential business-sector output = F (potential business-sector employment; ELEFF; actual 
capital-energy bundle), 
where: 
F denotes the outer production function [2]; and the inputs are: 
- .potential business-sector employment;" 
- the labor efficiency index; 
- the actual level of the capital-energy bundle;12 
and the definition of potential business-sector employment is: 
potential business-sector employment = "normal" labor force * (1 - NAWRU) - general 
government employment'3,'4. 
Potential output for the whole economy is then obtained by adding value added in the govern- 
ment sector and net indirect taxes to potential business-sector output. 
It is necessary to stress here that potential output based on standard production 
function refers implicitly to a production process in the long-run, when production capacities 
are determined by technological factors which are mostly related to a supply rather than short- 
run limitations related to a demand. 
3. Okun's Law: Applied 
In this section we shall make an extremely simplifying assumption that a centrally planned 
economy and also a post-socialist economy have the same features as established market 
economies and that the analytical methods used to quantify potential output in the latter are 
easily applicable also to the former. We slightly adjust the Okun's law concept and "fill" it 
by modified parameters derived from available statistical data for the Czech Republic. We 
shall see to what extent this approach is workable and whether it gives any reliable results. 
If we juxtapose the unemployment rate and GDP figures (without aspiration to 
discover any kind of relation or even causality between both variables) we receive Figures 
2 and 3. While the former depicts the development of the monthly unemployment rate and 
quarterly GDP data (in 1984 prices) the latter shows the changes of unemployment rate and 
GDP growth both based on yearly data. 
" Potential rather than actual employment is included because the latter may deviate from 
the level consistent with a stable rate of inflation while the former takes account of the so- 
called wage-price block. 
l 2  The level of the actual capital-energy bundle is used because it is supposed to reflect 
a relatively binding physical constraint on supply. 
l 3  It is the so-called "normal" labor force rather than the actual labor force which enters 
the definition of potential employment. The labor force has been "normalized" (by using a 
geometric moving average) to eliminate, as far as possible, the effects of cyclical fluctuations 
in labor force participation rates in order to avoid introducing undue volatility in the series 
for both potential employment and potential output. 
l 4  NAWRU stands for "non-accelerating wages rate of unemployment". 
- 
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Figure 2 Okun's Law in the Czech Republic? 
GDP (percentage change against previous year) 
Figure 3 Changes in GDP and Unemployment Rate 
These figures, indeed, show a very similar story: while 1989 was the last year of "standard" 
economic growth under a socialist system, the year 1990 became a mild overture to a 
slumpflationary 1991 when all unfavorable developments (both internal and external) fully 
broke out causing a dramatic decrease of output and a steady increase of unemployment. 1992 
witnesses further output decline and paradoxically an improvement of the unemployment 
front. Since the middle of 1992 until now, both variables stabilize despite the occurrence of 
some other negative circumstances (like the split of the country, the introduction of a new tax 
system, protracted privatization, recession in neighboring countries, etc.) While GDP figures 
are by many observers no1 expected to decline any more (this situation is sometimes described 
as "waving near the bottom"), unemployment is expected to increase. It seems that the 
economy reached a kind of short-run equilibrium with zero growth. 
The relative stability of the unemployment rate during six quarters (since the second 
quarter of 1992 until the third quarter of 1993) leads us to the suggestion that the economy 
oscillated in the short-run around a "quasi-natural rate of unemployment" which was about 
2.8 percent (as the average monthly rate of unemployment from April 1992 until September 
1993). Thus, we receive one parameter for the equation [I]. 1991 is the only period which 
seems to be reasonable for the derivation of the "transformation ratio" between the decline 
of output and the increase of unemployment. This is because both variables moved in the 
opposite direction which makes economic sense. From this point of view 1992 is a perverse 
year (decline of output accompanied by decline of unemployment) and 1993 can be character- 
ized as a steady state. Our interest is to find out whether it was a steady state with used or 
unused production resources. During 1991 the 14.2 percent decline of GDP was accompanied 
by the increase of the unemployment rate by 3.3 percentage points (unemployment rate 
increased from 1.1 percent in January 1991 to 4.4 percent in January 1992). The "ratio" is 
thus approximately 4.3 : 1 which means that the increase of the unemployment rate by one 
percentage point is "transformed" into 4.3 percent decrease of GDP according to conditions 
prevailing during 199 1. If we assume that such a ratio is applicable to the whole period 199 1 - 
1993, we receive the following equation for potential output: 
which says that every percentage point of the unemployment rate above 2.8 percent causes 
a decline of actual output under potential output by 4.3 percent, ceteris paribus. However, 
behind this simple statement, applying Okun's concept, several assumptions remain whose 
validity in reality is questionable. These are at least the following: 
Assumption 1: 1991 is a representative year in the sense that all shocks which the economy 
was exposed to were the demand side factors and not the supply-side factors. This condition 
is only hardly fulfilled because besides the strong demand contraction (decline of private 
consumption, loss of foreign demand, etc.) also strong supply-side disturbances influenced the 
economy ("oil-shock", devaluations, etc.). 
Assumption 2: 1991 is a typical year suitable both for the establishment of the transforma- 
tion ratio between the decline of output and the increase of unemployment. This is certainly 
not the case because 1991 was really the first year when only very initial measures of the 
reform were taken. For that reason many market institutions did not exist at all, markets were 
immature or even non-existent, economic policy instruments relied much on administrative 
tools and to a lesser extent on economic tools, etc. Therefore, the resulting transformation 
ratio however attractive it may look, must be taken with a great care. 
Assumption 3: The economy was using their resources fully in the preceding period until 
about 1990 and only later did the actual output start to diverge from the potential one. This 
assumption could be supported by the fact that the unemployment rate increased from 
virtually zero in January 1990 to only 0.8 percent in December 1990 which comfortably fits 
the criterion of fully used resources according to whatever market economy standard. While 
this can be true in a narrow and strict interpretation of the given macroeconomic evidence, 
this need not be true when we take a more general perspective which is the aim of Section 
5. If it turns out that a large part of production capacities was, in fact, not fully used before 
1990 then a certain decrease of utilization during 1990 onwards only contributed to a GDP- 
gap which existed before but which could not be identified when applying standard analytical 
tools on a non-standard economic condition prevailing under a centrally planned economy. 
Assumption 4: The unemployment rate is a reliable variable in macroeconomic analysis and 
can be taken as granted. The unemployment rate could be reliable only if the labor force does 
not change or changes in affordable limits. In fact the number of people employed in the 
whole national economy decreased from 5,387 thousand at the end of December 1990 to 
4,889 thousand at the end of December 1991 which is a decline of 497 thousand persons in 
absolute terms or 9 percent in relative terms. Despite the decisive share the decrease (between 
60-70 percent) represent people who retired because of being in "post-productive age", even 
the remaining 40-30 percent who left the labor force could have increased the unemployment 
rate dramatically if they would be counted as a labor force." 
Bearing these objections in mind, we may attempt to display the equation [3] relating 
actual and potential output via the only variable - unemployment rate (see Figure 4). The 
limits for the unemployment rate (2.5% and 3.2% respectively) are disregarded. 
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Figure 4 Potential Output Driven by Unemployment? 
Figure 4 shows that whenever the unemployment rate is lower than "quasi-natural rate of 
unemployment" (2.8 percent) actual output is, by a definition, higher than potential output and 
vice versa. Unemployment here is the only one driving force behind the inter-relation between 
I s  If we realize that 35 percent from 497 thousand employees is 174 thousand and the 
average number of unemployed in 1991 was 149 thousand, the resulting hypothetical 
unemployment rate could more than double the real one. 
actual and potential output. Figure 5 tells the same story, where the solid straight line is a 
fitted line to the potential output trajectory being thus the visualization of a variable which 
we want to find in our analysis. 
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Figure 5 Potential and Actual Output 
The inspection of Figures leads us to the following conclusions: 
1) Potential output declined heavily during the last 14 quarters of the transformation period. 
2) The unemployment rate, as the only factor relating actual and potential output, brings to 
a development of the latter an excessive variability and instability even on quarter to quarter 
basis. 
3) If there is any grain of truth in the above stated relationship, in 1990 the economy was 
extremely "overheated" (actual output much higher above the trend line of potential output) 
employing all resources nearly fully (in an utmost physical meaning), while 1991 and 1992 
brought more consistency between actual output and production potential. Such a conclusion, 
however, contradicts the development of some important macroeconomic indicators, like the 
rate of inflation, budget deficits, or trade deficits. If we take inflation into consideration, we 
see that its rate was "only" 10 percent per year in ("overheated") 1990 whereby a good 
portion is to be attributed to abolishing of food subsidies in July. Its generally low level can 
be explained by an extensive price regulation existing before the implementation of major 
reform steps at the very beginning of 1991. On the other hand, when the economy slipped 
into a depressionary year 1991 (when actual output was lower than potential output) the 
yearly inflation jumped to 57 percent which can be mostly attributed to price liberalization, 
monopoly pricing, preceding devaluations, etc. If we take into account the foreign trade 
balance normally we could expect its deficit in overheated years because of increased imports. 
In fact, exactly this occurred in 1990 but the main reason behind this was not a growth of 
nominal incomes but very strong inflationary and devaluation expectations which generated 
a sweeping buying spree of all economic subjects.I6 Depressionary 1991 and 1992 witnessed 
a faster growth of exports in relation to imports but the export boom can be attributed, to a 
large extent, to three devaluations at the end of 1990. In other words, in terms of Okun's law 
1992 is a contradictio in adjecto. 
4) It seems that systemic changes combined with numerous administrative and reform 
measures were so influential and had such a strong impact on the economy that there is no 
space for applying the standard market paradigm (at least on Okun's law basis) on the 
economy in transition. It is evident, that this method is very sensitive to the choice of the 
typical year or period for the establishment of both the transformation ratio between 
unemployment rate and GDP change, and the identification of the a kind of full employment 
("quasi-natural rate of unemployment'). 1991 seems to be the most promising basis for the 
first task and the period from the second quarter of 1992 through the third quarter of 1993 
as the reference period for quantifying the second parameter. As we do not have any better 
period-for-observation at our disposal and because the application of the above parameters in 
Okun's law framework does not have credibility (especially for 1990) we have to refuse this 
concept and postpone its application to later occasion when some kind of market normality 
will emerge. 
4. Technological Measures of Potential Output 
Other ways of how to approach potential output estimates consist in watching the utilization 
rates of production capacities andlor the utilization of other production factors. If a sufficient- 
ly long series of data is available, global peak (or two or three local peaks) is (are) then 
pragmatically taken as a year (or years) when production capacities were used to an extent 
which receives the tag "fully" and the level of output actually recorded at that year is declared 
as potential output. 
One of the indirect technological measures is a measure of electric utilization. This 
concept is based on two assumptions: a) there is a close relationship between real utilization 
of equipment and energy which is consumed to run the equipment; and b) all machines or 
equipment in the industry use the electricity as the only source of energy. The advantage of 
this measure is that it is not related to value variables and that it can be also applied on non- 
homogenous production and on non-homogenous production equipment. The development of 
time utilization of installed output of energetic equipment (measured in hours per year) in the 
former ~ S S R  and ~ S F R  (in 1990) is displayed in Figure 6 (see Table IA in the Appendix for 
the data). It shows the steady decline of the level until 1989 if we ignore the time series 
inconsistency in 1986 which was caused probably by the change of methodology of data 
collection or by a change of the definition of the concept. Unfortunately the data for 1990 
onwards are not available. 
Another method takes into account the labor force. It assumes that labor force is a 
limiting factor and that the utilization of equipment depends (assuming the fixed relation 
between capital and labor) on time utilization of the labor force. The so-called classic method 
l6  The population was buying foreign currency in large quantities. The rate of saving 
decreased from 3.7 percent in 1988 to 3.5 percent in 1989 to only 0.3 percent in 1990. There 
was a decrease of deposits in absolute terms for the first time since 1953. 
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Figure 6 Some Indicators of Utilization in Industry 
of utilization approximates the number of hours during which the machines work by a 
multiple of working shift coefficient (as a rough indicator of utilization during a day) and 
number of working hours per worker per year. The number of hours during which the 
equipment is in operation [PEO] is given by the formula: 
PEO = WH . SC [41 
where WH is the number of working hours per worker per year and SC is working shifts 
coefficient.17 Figure 7 (see Table I A  in the Appendix for the data) shows that the production 
equipment had been working (in terms of number of hours in operation) rather steadily until 
1988. Its mild medium-term decline during 1980-1988 reflected a decrease of the number of 
working hours per week from 41.7 in 1985 to 40.8 in 1986 (See Table IA) and a continuing 
abolishment of several working Saturdays per year during 1980s. A more rapid decline 
occurred in 1989 and especially in 1990 when both the number of working hours per worker 
per year and the working shifts coefficient decreased substantially. It is difficult to find out 
the reasons for the decline of both factors but part of the explanation could be that the 
working discipline worsened and the search for new jobs and higher fluctuation began to be 
more common. In any case, according to this method, the time during which the production 
equipment in industry was in operation was shortened by 5.3 percent in 1990 in comparison 
with the average during the period 1986-88. All three discussed measures are summarized in 
Figure 6. 
It must be noted, however, that many studies prove that shortening the working time 
does not necessarily lead to an equivalent decrease of production. Decreased number of 
working hours is partially offset by an increase of hourly productivity of labor caused by 
l 7  Working shifts coefficient is defined as the ratio between the total number of days 
worked in all three shifts and the number of days worked in the first shift during a year. 
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Figure 7 Operating Hours in Industry 
growing intensity and improved organization of work (Klacek, NeSporovB, 1983). All these 
circumstances should be taken into account when considering potential output in a given field. 
A supplementary though rather vague source of information comes from "business 
tendency tests" when the enterprises in given industries are asked about their capacity 
utilization during certain, quite short, periods of time. A representative sample of enterprises 
is chosen and the answers are weighted by the volume of production or by amount of 
employment. According to one research done in the Czech Republic in October 1992, the 
industrial respondents reported 74 percent capacity utilization while respondents in construc- 
tion even 83 percent utilization (Conjuncture Investigation, 1992). The value of such results 
is diminished by the subjective evaluation of capacity utilization by individual respondents 
and by inconsistency in time series. The data collected in this way have some indicative 
importance for the short- term conjuncture forecast but not for the potential output estimates. 
5. Indirect Mezzo-Economic Approach: Qualitative Analysis 
It can be maintained, that the macroeconomic approach, practiced in the previous section - 
using a high level of aggregation - can bring, in certain circumstances, the results of a 
disputable value. Stabilization, opening up, and restructuring of an economy during the 
transition may lead to changes of potential production capacities across individual industries 
which can fully cancel each other in their aggregate impact. Alas, this is a typical price paid 
for each macroeconomic approach. Therefore, more detailed mezzo-economic analysis is 
desirable to provide more revealing insights into the process of cross-industry restructuring. 
There are three pivotal questions to be asked and thus three answers to be found in 
our analysis. What was the level of potential output at the beginning of the transition? Which 
factors caused the shift of potential output and in which way? What is the level of potential 
output now? We attempt to answer all these questions. 
5. 1. Some systemic features of a centrally planned economy 
Before we answer the question "What was the level of potential output at the beginning of 
the transition?", we should recall some characteristic features of the logic of a centrally 
planned economy." The entire social-economic establishment of former socialist countries 
displayed numerous peculiarities, irregularities, or even abnormalities which contradicted 
common sense. They stemmed from one common reason which was the existence of 
generally soft, non-parametric economic environment occupied by socialist ultra- 
monopolies. All phenomena concerning the behavior of all economic (or better quasi- 
economic) agents could be fruitfully attributed to this basic "system-building principle". Non- 
parametric environment penetrated virtually all segments of the economic system covering 
planning procedures, price system, trade relations, labor market, and financial-credit system. 
Because every system dislikes inconsistencies, all these parts of one "big factory" had to 
cooperate in a concerted way (and did so very "efficiently" and consequently). One of the 
major "tasks" of a typical production unit was to develop every effort to influence the soft 
external environment and subject it to its own interests. The open possibility to do this 
consumed the energy of managers to such an extent that the effort to increase the internal 
economic efficiency of the enterprises was largely disregarded. The necessity to form broad 
enterprise coalitions was manifested by intensive and numerous relations of the enterprise 
managers to the "outside world". Constant bargaining of managers for example with the State 
Planning Commission (for soft plans which could be easily fulfilled), with the Central Price 
Committee (for the highest attainable prices of the production), with suppliers (for the highest 
quantities of materials needed and all imaginable conditions of "preferential treatment"), with 
the mono-bank system (for granting the necessary financing), with the local state bodies (for 
acquiring as much labor as possible), with other central bodies (for getting as much 
investment means as possible), and again with the mono-bank (for having as much foreign 
currencies as possible) are described as a "sap-type reflex" which was a predominant type of 
behavior determining both the macroeconomic and microeconomic features of the system. 
These were for example: 
1) Low level of capital utilization 
In prevailing cases the enterprises were not forced to use their production equipment 
intensively or efficiently in a standard westem-type meaning. A soft, competition-free, and 
monopolistic environment provided small incentives to economize costs. It was the case that 
enterprises were interested in hiding their real production-possibility frontier against higher 
"planning" bodies. The higher the capital intensive production plan which an enterprise 
succeeded in "selling" (pushing through) to the "planning" body, the higher capacity reserve 
was incorporated into the plan and the easier fulfillment in the next period was "guaranteed". 
In order to create the highest possible reserve, the enterprises demanded (and during long 
years successfully hoarded) higher than really needed capital stock which was only partly 
used. High production, maintenance, and overhead costs were usually smoothly "smuggled" 
into prices which were in a prevailing environment of shortage willingly accepted by price- 
l 8  Our task here is not to present a full description and explanation of models dealing with 
CPEs. Rather, we want to mention briefly some characteristics which are, according to us, 
relevant for the potential output analysis. Some observations by L. MlEoch (1990) are 
reflected here. 
taking customers. Soft budget constraint combined with an endless subsidization of apparently 
insane enterprises by comparably "prosperous" ones created no pressures on economizing the 
resources neither in "bad" nor in "good" enterprises and led to a long-run demoralization of 
producers and an erosion of existing incentives. It was also quite common that the production 
of technologically more complicated products was often interrupted because of the lack of 
materials or component parts. Just-in-time methods were, for many producers, something like 
a "bad joke". Enterprises sometimes used quite extensively rather old machines and premises. 
Because they were largely written off the maintenance costs and energy intensity were high 
but technological parameters of the production were low. Resulting widespread inefficiencies 
were reflected by a low levels of both one-factor and multi-factor productivity in comparison 
with market economies and many other indicators. 
2) Low level of working time utilization 
Another production factor - labor - enjoyed the similar treatment as capital. The "sapping 
instinct" also led to the hoarding of labor. An excessive number of people were employed in 
many countless departments of enterprises whose main tasks were not related to production 
activities but to the subjection of external soft environment and/or to the producing of 
"reports" for higher planning bodies which, alas, had no information value for enterprises 
themselves. The competition for the "rests" of the available employees created a peculiar 
situation of the general shortage of labor on the nation-wide "labor market" but of hidden 
unemployment inside the enterprises.'' Also, in order not to act against the logic of the 
system the workers used to work for a certain number of hours per day only (for example 6.5 
hours) in order to fulfill the plan just by a certain amount of percentage points (for example 
by 117,5 percent) to "deserve" the highest possible wage without hardening the working 
norms and increasing the plan for the next planning period (ratchet effect). The dark side of 
having an easy life as producers, the people had to "pay the price" as consumers. An 
incredible time was spent by the nation in queues of different kinds by searching for the 
lacking services or better quality products during official working hours. The vicious circle 
of low productivity was thus only reinforced. People also typically worked a lot in their 
houses and gardens (in their real small kingdoms) during the weekends and they "returned" 
back to work to "have a rest" and "recover" from demanding week-end "shifts". It is easy to 
imagine that the work intensity was not very high on average and only in some factories or 
branches was comparable with western  standard^.^' 
3) Regular existence of technological imbalances in production 
It was very customary that because of the planning system it was extremely difficult to reach 
and maintain (both in individual enterprises and in the whole economy) such allocation of 
production factors which would satisfy all necessary technological proportions and ensure a 
technologically optimum production. The ensuing existence of bottlenecks thus negatively 
determined not only actual output possibilities but especially potential output. It is reasonable 
I' The high level of employment is reflected by the extremely high participation rate of 
both men and women. Svejnar (1993) suggests that female labor force participation in former 
Czechoslovakia - 83.4 percent in 1989 - was one of the highest in the world. 
20 According to some estimates the long-term utilization of working time in the 
construction industry was not higher than 50 percent. 
to assume that, in many cases, even relatively small additional investment directed to a proper 
place of the existing bottlenecks could have increased potential output significantly. Serious 
long-term technological imbalance existed between capital stock and labor. As a matter of 
fact, the increase in production had been achieved most importantly by a vigorous growth of 
investment especially during 1970s and 1980s. However, because of the relative shortage of 
labor, the increase of production used to be frequently less than proportional to the unbal- 
anced increase of the new capital stock and additional labor. 
4) Limited influence of foreign trade 
There was a semi-Chinese wall between the domestic economy and foreign markets. In the 
case of former Czechoslovakia two thirds of foreign trade turnover was realized with other 
socialist countries (with the same kind of non-parametric environment) and only one third 
with market economies and developing countries. However, the system of export subsidies 
and controlled imports largely eliminated any direct threat from foreign competition. I do not 
want to claim that certain export-oriented sectors or enterprises were not influenced at all but 
the aggregate impact of the external environment on the whole economy was marginal. 
5) High level of inventories 
In addition to the hoarding of other production factors, firms typically accumulated a high 
level of input inventories encouraged by enormous difficulties connected with their acquisi- 
tion. Only small economic costs were incurred with excessive inventories because credits for 
working capital were granted by a passive financial system without any major problems. 
6) Demand overhang, supply constrained markets and forced substitution 
Because of controlled prices and wages which did not reflect the real performance of labor, 
smaller or bigger monetary overhand accumulated in centrally planned economies over the 
years. The existing system of relative prices and unshakable position of producers forced 
consumers to consumption patterns which did not satisfy their preferences adequately 
implying over-consumption of subsidized items and under-consumption of over-taxed items. 
The above mentioned points show that the system driven by distortionary "norms" and 
peculiar incentives produced a bizarre type of rationality incomparable with a market-derived 
type of efficiency. The consequence of its consistent enforcement was systemic-conditioned 
and everywhere present wasting not only all production factors (capital, labor, production 
materials, energy) but also time and natural creativity of people. These observations lead us 
to the suggestion that the actual output level might have been well below the potential output 
under a centrallv vlanned system. But the reasons why the gap existed were much different 
from the reasons why the GDP-gap exists in market economies. While in the former case the 
reasons stemmed largely from the features embodied in the very logic of the centrally planned 
economy, the latter case refers mostly to fluctuations of the aggregate demand. Because both 
concepts refer to completely different circumstances and a different set of factors the necessity 
to develop a kind of transformation bridge between the centrally planned economy and the 
market economy emerges. In the following subsection this transformation bridge is outlined 
and some definitions and approached are presented. 
5. 2. Three concepts of potential output: definitions 
The following concepts are suggested in our potential output analysis: 
Technical potential output (TPO) refers to a maximum volume of output which can be 
produced with the existing capital equipment when fully using disposable calendar time from 
which the time needed for necessary repairs and maintenance is subtracted. This definition 
puts TPO equal to a technological capacity of the production equipment, which is fully 
derived from its technical features. Any additions to the aggregate capital stock could be 
automatically considered as an increase of the production potential no matter what happens 
with hypothetically produced output later on. In graphical terms, TPO as a most simple 
concept, can be expressed as the production possibility frontier and new investment as its shift 
outward. By definition, it is the least fluctuating variable independent of any economic 
conditions. 
Economic potential output (EPO) adjusts the technical potential output to the conditions on 
the market in the medium-run. These conditions comprise prices of final products, costs of 
production factors, aggregate demand, the structure of relative prices of substitutes and 
complements to given products, etc. The main criterion here is the medium- and long-term 
competitiveness of the production of a given firm, industry or the whole economy: as an 
economic potential of the country only those production capacities could be regarded which 
produce the output which is effectively demanded not only in the short-term but also in the 
medium- and long-term. An implicit condition is the prevalence of long-term "normal working 
conditions" i.e., usual number of shifts or working hours, usual intensity of work, usual 
availability of production inputs (energy or semi-finished products), e t ~ . ~ '  
Systemic-conditioned potential output (SCPO) then adjusts the technical potential output and 
economic potential output to the factors stemming from the given economic establishment and 
to the factors which are indirectly related to broadly defined social parameters. While the 
former cover the features driven by economic incentives and interests (like the above 
mentioned systemic-induced low utilization of working time) the latter include the broader 
non-economic set of legislative norms (like work legislation or social net laws) valid or 
followed in the given country and time. These may also reflect the social values and norms 
being accepted by the majority of people. To paraphrase Leibenstein's concept we may use 
the notation 'y-efficiency' implying thus the explanatory transformation bridge in the 
movement from the centrally-planned socio-economic system to the market one. In the 
analysis of potential output in a homogeneous world (either market or centrally planned) this 
concept would be missing. Though the concept is difficult to operationalize, from the 
methodological point of view we consider its introduction here as essential. 
2' The concept of "normal working conditions" could also be applied in case of technical 
potential output. Then we can discern a so-called pure capacity of production equipment and 
practical capacity of production equipment, which takes into account the discussed factors. 
It is observable regularity that practical capacity fluctuates more than the pure (technological) 
capacity. 
It is obvious, that the borders between all these concepts are somewhat blurred because 
of different interrelations and feed-backs. These are typically the economic incentives that 
shape the general attitudes of the population (especially private entrepreneurs) to the work- 
effort or working overtime rather than any administrative measures. Also, technological 
parameters of a newly introduced investment are not derived from technical but rather from 
the economic (more broad) parameters of the old equipment. 
Despite these objections, the usefulness of the above-stated categorization could still 
be advocated. Especially the comprehension of the concept of systemic-conditioned potential 
output plays a significant role in understanding the evolution of production potential issues 
during transition from a centrally planned to a market-based system. This concept would not 
emerge in the analysis of potential output in established market economies at all. 
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Figure 8 Three Concepts of Potential Output 
Actual output, to be complete, refers to the output produced in a given period of time. It is 
typically determined by the short-term or seasonal fluctuations of the aggregate demand and 
other transitory shocks. The above outlined concepts of potential outputs are illustrated in Fig- 
ure 8. The highest level occupies technical potential output, the middle level the economic 
potential output and the lowest level the systemic-conditioned potential output. The order 
indicates how technical PO and economic PO respectively has to be adjusted to arrive at an 
observable level of output. The lower panel of the figure portrays the emergence of systemic- 
conditioned potential output when a centrally planned economy is established (point A) and 
its fading out during the transition period to the market (period B to C)". The difference 
between Y'e and Y'sc (on the upper panel) and between SCPO and EPO (on the bottom 
panel) indicates a "systemic-driven GNP-gap" defined as an output which is lost because the 
logic of a centrally planned economy imposes sui generis limits on the utilization of all 
production factors available. 
Observations from subsection 5.1, with the help of the concepts introduced in this 
subsection lead us to the suggestion that under the centrally planned economy, the 
potential production possibilities of the country (in terms of economic potential output) 
were substantially higher than actual output which was driven by systemic-conditioned 
potential output. The word "substantially" means that the output gap (in terms of percentage 
points) in former CPE was several times higher than in market economies and that this gap 
was never "zero" or "close to zero" under standard socialism as used to be the case in market 
economies several times during the post-war period. We shall try to investigate how the 
production potential increases during the transition period without putting more substantial 
investment into operation. In other words, we shall study how successfully the economy 
moves from the trajectory of systemic-conditioned potential output to a path of economic 
potential output benefiting mostly from the introduction of the market system. 
5. 3. Some assumptions and working hypotheses 
As the potential output analysis is cumbersome, a kind of the black box approach seems to 
be advisable and instrumental. We do not aspire to identify, describe, explain and quantify 
all of the possible relations between numerous quasi-dependent and quasi-independent 
variables in the whole picture. Instead, we regard the potential output as an unknown variable 
(being thus a mystery of the black box) and speculate about its location and changes by 
considering the evolution of observable variables (inputs and outputs) which are supposed to 
bear some relevant information. The application of this indirect method assumes the 
formulation of certain intuitive working assumptions about the expected relations between 
22 AS J. G ~ C S  correctly suggested the path of the systemic-conditioned potential output 
after introduction of the centrally planned economy might have look differently. There was 
not probably a decline of potential output (as showed on the figure) but a steep rise generated 
by fast industrialization and by enthusiasm of the large part of population in the era of the 
"build-up" of communism. A more detailed look at this period, indeed, is beyond the intention 
of this paper but the caveat can be done that careful distinction must be made between 
increase of the potential output itself (which definitely was the case) and the high level of 
utilization of existing resources (which was the case as well). 
measurable variables and potential output. These could be the following: 
1) The whole analysis is more workable the more free is the market formation of prices and 
the more demand constrained are particular markets. 
2) Price-, trade- and foreign trade liberalizations had most probably diversified impacts on 
different industries, sectors and regions. Generally, those sectors which were "over-dimension- 
ed" under the centrally planned economy are supposed to decline and whose sectors which 
were "under-dimensioned'' are expected to grow. The respective movements of "sectoral 
potential outputs" are to be anticipated. Therefore, the desegregated or mezzo-economic 
(cross-industries and cross-sectoral) approach seems to be necessary and proper. 
3) The economy in transition is exposed to numerous shocks. They originate both on the 
demand and on the supply side of the economy; they are caused both by external reasons and 
by reform-induced causes. In potential output analysis we tend to disregard the short run or 
temporary disturbances which are in some way absorbed by a system. Rather, we take into 
account only persistent shocks with protracted impacts. 
4) There is asymmetry in the factors which move the level of potential output (production 
possibility frontier respectively). While the increase of the potential output23 can be generat- 
ed by: 
new fixed investment (additions to the existing capital stock), or 
employment of additional labor (in existing production bottlenecks), or 
increased utilization of production factors, all ceteris paribus; 
its decrease can be induced by a different set of factors. They comprise: 
permanent decrease of the aggregate demand, or 
negative supply-side shocks which are irreversible in the medium and long-run, or 
permanent loss of international competitiveness caused by external factors or by exchange 
rate movements, or 
(understandably) decreased utilization of the production factors, or 
physical liquidation of capital assets (as an extreme case), again all ceteris paribus. 
5) I assume that these factors could be directly or indirectly monitored by the evolution of 
inventory accumulation and decumulation, sales, changes of capacity utilization, by changes 
of employment, profits, exports and imports, etc. These variables are not equally important 
in all circumstances, rather they make a set of indicators which, taken together, could have 
some explanatory power.24 
23 The right-ward shift of the vertical curve in AS-AD diagram or outward shift of the 
production possibility frontier. 
24 An additional reason why different proxies are advisable stems from the fact that 
official statistical data concerning the newly emerging private sector are biased downwards, 
because of the countless number of incentives to cheat the state administration or to hide 
6) The potential output level (both in the whole economy and in any particular industry) is 
likely to increase when either net investment grows ceteris paribus and/or employment grows 
ceteris paribus and/or capacity utilization grows ceteris paribus, with all of the actual output 
being sold, all in the long-run. On the other hand, potential output level is likely to diminish 
when net investments are zero and employment decreases and capacity utilization decreases 
and finished goods inventories increase all at the same time in the long-run. Because a great 
number of possibilities may exist and their assessment would be extremely complicated and 
not furnished due to the absence of statistical data, several possible alternatives are outlined 
in Table 2A in the Appendix without any further discussion. 
7) Another indication of inventory accumulation consists in a faster decline of sales in 
comparison with actual The expected implications for potential output evolution 
stemming from the relationship between actual output and long-term inventories are described 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Hypothesis About the Impacts of Actual Output and Long-term Inventories on Potential Output 
I I 
movements of 
observable variables description 
actual long-term 
o u t ~ u t  inventories 
hypothesis on behavior 
of the potential output 
+ 
growing warehouse cleaning - "everything is sold out" 
+ 
0 
A+ 
+ stagnant production for warehouse A - 
0 
I + I declining production for warehouse - "no-hope case" I A- I I 
growing production for warehouse 
growing market clearing 
I I I 
stagnant warehouse cleaning 
A0 (if both growth equally) 
A+ 
0 
A+ 
- 
Explanation of signs: + growth; 0 steady state; - decline; 
I1 - 
8) The potential output analysis is critically dependent on the level of international competi- 
tiveness of individual industries and of the whole economy. The level of the exchange rate 
of the currency plays a crucial role. If the currency is undervalued, large parts of the economy 
are protected against import competition and the dividing line between prosperous and 
unhealthy enterprises or industries is generous towards many, providing smaller incentives for 
an active restructuring. On the other hand, if the currency is overvalued, the segment of 
stagnant market clearing 
I I I 
black economy activities. Indeed, also proxies may be biased in different directions. 
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25 Berg (1993) suggests that output decline caused by production bottlenecks would be 
manifested by inventory decumulation. On the other hand, the demand contraction would lead 
firms at the beginning both to cuts in production and to accumulation of inventories. 
I 
declining market clearing 
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A- 
competitive industries shrinks and the incentives either for restructuring or for closing down 
of enterprises increase. 
9) Quite revealing for the potential output analysis is the recognition whether the current 
decline of the economic performance was caused by supply-side factors or rather by demand- 
side factors. To get a more plastic view, we take into account the time dimension. The 
anticipated development of relevant variables in time are portrayed on Figures 9 and 
While Figure 9 shows a demand-side shock, Figure 10 models a supply-side shock. There 
are altogether seven periods under consideration. Period one shows the stabilized situation on 
the market under sbcialism. Period two simulates the situation before price and trade 
liberalization (driven mainly by expectations) and period three the changes after these 
liberalizations. Periods four through seven show adjustment processes under different circum- 
stances. 
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Figure 9 Price Demand Shock 
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First, we consider a price-demand shock (Figure 9). There is a demand overhang due to 
artificially low prices under a centrally planned economy which even increases before price 
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26 These pictures elaborate the ideas by Sip (1991) and Berg (1993). 
liberalization. On the lower panel it is reflected by an increase of household inventories 
(hoarding goods in expectation of a price jump) and a decrease of retail trade inventories. 
After the price jump demanded goods plummet down and retail trade inventories start 
increasing ceteris paribus. When they reach the highest level (affordable for the retailers) they 
stop ordering new goods from producers and start decumulation in their warehouses. During 
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Figure 10 Cost Supply Shock 
period four the "black card" is passed over to the producers. They do not stop the production 
but see the inventories stock piling. They start to act only when their inventories attain the 
highest possible level. Only after that (in period five) they adjust to the changed market 
condition, while retailers already adjusted in terms of quantity adjustment. Assuming that they 
preserved until period five a monopoly position (and above average mark-ups) on the market, 
during period six they will start loosing it. Because producers start using other distribution 
channels, they are forced to decrease their profit margins and the prices tend to decline. This 
recovers the demand and the supply follows until equilibrium is attained with all three types 
of agents reaching the original and sustainable level of inventories. The initial shock is thus 
absorbed by the system which shift from non-market disequilibrium to a market equilibrium. 
The implication for potential output is that it does not change only the production gap widens 
temporarily as a consequence of demand fluctuation. 
Another situation emerges when supply shock is in place (Figure 10). While the 
development is identical with the preceding case in the first two periods it diverges in the 
third. We assume that inputs costs increase substantially which causes problems in the 
production connected for example with a limited substitution of production factors. As a 
consequence, supply decreases rapidly and the existing (though also declining) demand is 
being partially satisfied by the depletion of retail trade inventories. After their depletion at the 
end of period three the depletion of producer's inventories starts and their depletion at the end 
of period four adds to another price increase and demand decline. After depletion of 
households inventories at the end of period five the most critical - period six - arrives. If the 
domestic supply does not recover (even when "exposed" to such a high prices) a long-run 
import substitution has to come on stage and bring about the decrease of prices implying an 
irreversible decline of potential output. If, on the other hand, domestic supply recovers in a 
reasonably short time it is up to our judgment (or introduction of another criteria) whether 
potential output changed or not. 
The whole inspection is difficult because of several reasons. As Berg (1993) points 
out, one problem is connected with the way of properly measuring the real inventories in the 
inflationary period when the accumulated stocks are counted in historical costs. Another 
inconvenience arises from the fact that statistical data about inventories in private trade firms 
are difficult to obtain and, namely, this sector developed most rapidly. 
6. A Glimpse of Statistical Data 
Figure 11 (see Tables 6A and 6Aa in the Appendix for the data) juxtaposes the development 
of relevant variables. "Inventories of goods" reflect the stock of output at wholesalers and 
retailers (including semi-finished products) which is bought with the purpose to be sold. 
"Products", on the other hand, is an output which is on the stock of the producers. While the 
first term records primarily the items which are traded, the second refers mainly to output 
which is still in the hands of direct producers. 
Bearing in mind the above mentioned qualifications and inescapable suspicion towards 
reliability of data, we can discern two different patterns. Inventories of goods seem to indicate 
much stronger adjustment than inventories of products having the turning point in the first 
quarter of 199 1. Somewhat surprising is only the marginal sensitivity of inventories off goods 
to a buying spree in the last quarter of 1990 (steep increase of retail sales curve) and its 
extended (and not accelerated) trend in the first quarter of 1991 in spite of a spectacular 
decline of retail sales. However, since the second quarter of 1991 a constant decline of 
inventories of goods is visible. However, it is questionable to what extent was this swift 
adjustment (accompanied by a further decline of retail trade) translated into vigorous growth 
in inventories of products from the fourth quarter 1990 to the third quarter of 1991. The 
sequence of both developments seem to indicate that the adjustment of producers was delayed 
by half a year compared to the trading sector. The general observation is that during 12 
quarters the inventories of goods decreased to a lower level in comparison with the pre-reform 
period while inventories of products stabilized on higher level than before. If this is the case, 
we may conclude that the trading sector found a kind of low inventories equilibrium and the 
burden of adjustment was shifted to producers which seem to be less flexible and show a 
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Figure 11 GDP, Inventories, and Retail Trade Sales 
higher inertia. Returning to Figures 9 and 10 we may conclude that empirical evidence based 
on inventories confirm the price-demand shock hypothesis of Figure 9 and reject the cost- 
supply shock hypothesis of Figure 10 although the reality is less persuasive than the pure 
concepts suggested. 
More light on the demand- versus supply-driven shock dispute is shed in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Wage-Push Inflation in Industry? 
Figure 1227 portrays real wages28, industrial production and prices of industrial producers. 
Although it does not identify the reasons behind the increase of prices of industrial producers 
it brings conclusive arguments in favor of the hypothesis that the increase was not generated 
by real wages. Genuinely inverse movements of both variables refuses the inflationary impact 
of real wage costs supporting thus the demand shock hypothesis. 
Certain information about the shape of the demand shock we receive if we look at the 
development of some price indices. A more or less uniform development of both consumer 
and producer prices is documented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Price Indices 
The only striking exception is prices of agriculture producers (and partially also food prices) 
which increased only marginally in contrast with all the other indices implying a negative 
income redistribution away from agriculture producers and worsening of production 
conditions. "Closing" of agricultural "scissors" indicates the decline of potential output in this 
sector. 
An additional grain of truth can bring the inspection of profits in main economic 
sectors (see Figures 14 and 15; see Table 7 in the Appendix for the data). Figure 14 indicates 
that the sum of all industries (including extractive, processing, electricity, gas, and water, etc.) 
play a dominant role in the bulk of overall profits. The fluctuation of profits after a relatively 
calm 1990 became very wild during 1991 - the year of liberalization - and then settled 
down somewhat during 1992, and again being pushed up by the introduction of VAT at the 
beginning of 1993. A closer look at other industries (Figure 15) suggests a characteristic 
pattern of movements showing generally black numbers before the beginning of the reform 
27 Statistical source: Bulletin of the Czech Statistical Office, September 1993. 
28 Real wages in industry are computed as nominal wages in industry deflated by GDP 
deflator. 
Industrial branches 
Figure 14 Gross Profits 
and still in the first half of the year 1991 and oscillations around zero in successive quarters. 
We can also observe that agriculture (preserving obvious seasonal movements of profits and 
having its more bright days after crops) becomes a net looser during transition getting into 
troubles and red numbers. This unfavorable trend fully confirms the conclusions made during 
the assessment of price indices. 
Transportation, storing, communication 
Figure 15 Gross Profits in Selected Sectors 
It must be stressed, however, that profits reported by enterprises or industrial branches need 
not be a good signpost of the real profitability of given activities. The time consistency is 
especially doubtful. The term 'profit' in the first half of 1990 (when strong subsidization of 
enterprises and also retail prices was practitioned) refers, most probably, to something else 
than the term 'profit' after price liberalization in 1991 or even in late 1993. 
Another perspective is obtained if we look at the international competitiveness. Hughes 
and Hare (1991) estimated the level of competitiveness of desaggregated industries on 1987 
or 1988 data for the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The comparison of value- 
added at world prices relative to their value-added at domestic prices brought the following 
results for Czechoslovakia (based on 1987 data): Industries with negative value-added at 
world prices (e.g., net value subtracting industries) comprised many branches in food industry 
and also tobacco and leather products. On the other hand, the most competitive industries in 
terms of world prices seemed to be pottery and chinaware, glass and glassware, machinery, 
transport equipment, other manufacturers and quite competitive also plastic products and non- 
ferrous metallurgy. 
A more detailed look into the performance of selected industries in the Czech Republic 
during transition period is provided in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Production of Goods in Selected Industries 
Figure 16 (see Table 8 in the Appendix for the data) shows that four industries (fuel, 
electricity and heat, food, and chemicals) somehow adjusted to the reform-related shocks 
decreasing their output marginally or somewhat. On the other edge of the diapason we see 
"hopeless cases" like mechanical engineering, metal working, clothing, and especially non- 
ferrous metallurgy which lost the most. If the decline in these branches will continue in the 
next several quarters we could reasonably assume that potential output in these industries 
diminished markedly because the overall economic decline already stopped implying a more 
fundamental loss of competitiveness. In any case, the figure confirms the conclusion that if 
some competitive advantages do exist in current reforming countries, they tend to be in 
industries with a lower level of value-added. Unfortunately, this analysis cannot be completed 
by the information about employment in the given branches due to the absence of data. 
To get a kind of complementary picture, we might be interested in knowing whether 
these trends were translated also into import and export performance. Figures 17 - 22 (see 
Table 9A in the Appendix for the data) show the shares of commodity groups (according to 
SITC classification) in total exports and total imports of the Czech Republic and the ratios 
of commodity groups exports and imports in nominal GNP respectively. 
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Figure 17 Exports by Commodity Groups (SITC) 
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Figure 18 Shares of Commodity Groups in Total Exports 
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Figure 19 Ratios of Commodity Groups Exports to Nominal GNP 
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Figure 20 Imports by Commodity Groups (SITC) 
On the export side, we observe a relative increase of the share of intermediate manufactured 
products (during 1989-1993) and relative decrease of machinery and transport equipment with 
other groups being approximately stable. The same kind of shift occurred also in terms of the 
ratio to nominal GNP implying more or less permanent restructuring of tradables away from 
higher value-added to lower value-added activities. On the import side, the share of machinery 
and transport equipment, chemicals, and intermediate manufactured products increased in 
relative terms being even more explicit in terms of the ratio to nominal GNP; the share of 
fuel decreased somewhat. 
Real life events (recorded in the Czech Republic) seem to contradict the analysis by 
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Figure 21 Shares of Commodity Groups in Total Imports 
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Figure 22 Ratios of Commodity Groups Imports in Nominal GNP 
Hughes and Hare (based on former Czechoslovakian data) as far as non-ferrous metallurgy, 
machnery and food is concerned. While relative shares of machinery and transport equipment 
(both in terms of total exports and in terms of the ratio of exports to nominal GNP) dimin- 
ished, the share of intermediate products and food increases. A mirror development can be 
seen in imports of machinery and transport equipment whose share increased both in terms 
of total imports and in terms of ratio to nominal GNP. 
A well known fact is that the whole economic structure and especially industrial 
structure was distorted towards the secondary sector and towards heavy industries respectively 
under CPE. As a consequence, the restructuring towards patterns common in developed 
economies could have been anticipated. However, these trends, at least in industry, do not 
seem to be vigorously initiated during the first several years of transition. Landesmann (1991) 
concludes that the "recent developments have rather strengthened the position of those parts 
of the industrial sector (in spite of strong falls in output levels) where reorganization is most 
needed". Similarly, a major role under CPE played a heavy subsidization of energy prices. 
Therefore, it could have been reasonably expected that the composition of industrial output 
biased strongly towards energy-intensive industries like paper products, pottery, glass, 
structural clay products, non-metallic mineral products and ferrous metallurgy (Hughes, Hare) 
should be shaken after the abolishment of distortionary subsidization. Statistical data indicate, 
again, that this is far from being the case. 
Last but not least piece of information we receive from Table 4A (in the Appendix) 
which shows the investment activities in the period 1988 - 1991. We see a significant decline 
of overall investment both in production branches and in non-production branches in 1991 
compared to 1989. The only exception is an increase of investments into machines and 
equipment in trade (by almost 62 percent), which is, however, small in absolute terms. This 
strongly indicates the take-off of this traditionally (under socialism) under-developed sector 
connected with the progress in small-scale privatization. Among the major sectors, agriculture 
records the most critical decline of investment especially into machines and equipment. 
Particularly revealing is the peak of investment into machines and equipment in the whole 
economy (increase by 12.7 percent on 1990189 basis) and especially in industry (increase by 
21.3 percent) in 1990 followed by a steep decline in 1991. This extraordinary phenomenon 
can be explained by a strong effort of enterprises to buy (or better spend on) any possible 
piece of equipment for available money before price liberalization and connected devaluations 
come into effect. Another striking fact is a incomparably faster increase of investment (both 
into construction works and into machines and equipment) in non-production branches (by 
16.6 percent) compared to production branches (by 2.1 percent) in 1990. The evidence 
suggests that with the exception of trade, there is no argument that in the whole economy any 
kind of potential output could have increased since the beginning of 1991. Rather its decrease 
could be anticipated. In any case both years - 1990 and 1991 - brought into an investment 
process very strong disturbances. If we realize the depth of decline of overall investment in 
1991 compared to 1989 (22 percent) we may express serious doubts about the efficiency of 
hastily done investment in 1990. The aggregated view on the investment process is shown in 
Figure 23 (based on data from Table 4A). 
7. Potential Output: Resolution 
This analysis was to done in order to arrive at a more precise judgment about three points: 
1) whether the actual output decline was caused by demand or supply shock (or by any 
combination of both); 
2) whether the changes are permanent or just transitory, and 
3) what factors or variables could have some explanatory power for the potential output issue. 
1) If the demand shock would be the case, there is a higher probability, that the existing 
production capacities do not become automatically unusable forever. Rather it could simply 
mean that they are not used for the time being and the existing output-gap will be replaced 
after demand recovers to the previous level. This could be indirectly indicated by across-the- 
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Figure 23 Investment in the Czech Republic 
board and parallel movements of economic activity in all industries regarding the specific 
sensitivity of each one to the aggregate demand fluctuations. 
However, due to changes in relative prices after price and foreign trade liberalizations 
we could have witnessed structural shifts of aggregate demand both on the domestic market 
and in the foreign demand for domestic production. The demand for foreign (though 
expensive) goods increased substantially and domestic producers in some industries 
experienced problems indicating that either their supply response was sluggish or that they 
inherited a competitive disadvantage. 
On the other hand, if the negative supply shock would be on stage, the inventory 
accumulation is to appear and non-parallel movements of individual industries are to be 
anticipated with the profound decline in those which were most hit (for example energy- 
intensive industries). If aggregate demand would pertain on the previous level, more robust 
incentives for the cost adjustment could be expected as well as inflationary pressures. After 
price liberalization, sharp shifts could be discerned on production factor markets. 
The overall evaluation of the disposable data leads us to the conclusion that the 
combination of shocks occurred in case of the Czech transformation with the demand shock 
being stronger and more profound while the supply shock having more selective impacts 
across the sectors and industries. 
In any case we should understand that the supply response was strongly limited by 
numerous factors. These are: inherited and inflexible production potential, rudimentary 
markets and limited production factors mobility, unclear property rights, underdeveloped 
market institutions, to enumerate just some of them. More dynamic restructuring is being 
hindered by a limited substitution between production factors. 
2) If we find out that permanent shocks are the case we may assume that the actual output 
reflects the movement of potential output. If, on the other hand, we identify only transitory 
changes, GDP-gap occurs and we could conclude that actual output records become a poor 
guide for the indication of the potential output location. However, it is quite difficult to 
discern the character of the changes, because more types (external versus internal, reform- 
induced versus long-term versus cyclical, repeatable versus unrepeatable) are combined at 
once. As prime candidates for permanent shock, according Blanchard and Fischer (1989), are 
improvements in productivity or changes in the labor force in standard market-based 
economies. In economies in transition several more additional shocks emerge. They comprise 
opening of countries to real economic environment, collapse of CMEA market, deep 
restructuring of whole economic sectors, build-up of market type institutions, etc. The reason 
for a careful assessment of different shocks provides the case of former East Germany which 
was capable of increasing the output after a steep decline in an unexpected scale implying an 
existence of an "hidden output". 
3) Because we cannot rely much on the variables like inflation or unemployment, we will 
watch the employment data more closely and elaborate another kind of inquiry here. 
We may assume that the number of people employed approximates the medium-term 
expectations of enterprises as far as the future economic outlooks is concerned. Table 5A in 
the Appendix and Figures 24 and 25 show the employment in all major sectors in the 
economy. 
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Figure 24 Structure of Employment in the Economy by Sector 
Apart from the decline of total employment by 8 percent, the most striking development is 
rather steep and steady decline of the employment in industry and even steeper in agriculture. 
The number of employees declined by 11.5 percent in the former and by 28 percent in the 
latter during the period 1990-1992. On the other hand, a recognizable growth can be regis- 
tered in construction (4.5 percent), in trade and communication (6.6 percent). Spectacular 
increase, indeed, can be seen in banking (93 percent) whose share on overall employment is, 
however, negligible. In spite of the decline of employment in trade in absolute terms, its share 
in total employment increased from 13.5 percent to 14.3 percent confirming thus the position 
of the second most important sector. 
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If we compare the dynamics of the decline in employment with the decline of production 
(Figure 26)29, we see a slower pace of the former implying a decline in productivity (see 
Figure 27)30. At least two explanations can be found for this development. Firstly, the 
enterprises do not shed labor in proportion to the decline of production due to the fear that 
they will not be able to find the needed labor in the future when demand recovers. This is a 
typical phenomenon also in market economies. Secondly, in addition to 'labor hoarding', the 
enterprises, in their effort to escape the excessive wage tax (implemented in 1991), probably 
employ more workers than they would without income policy. 
A feasible way how to estimate potential output in industry seems to consist in the 
adjustment of actual output to employment and productivity. However, both employment 
and productivity should be adjusted. We make the following assumptions: 
1) The labor productivity recorded in 1990 (yearly average) will serve as a benchmark. We 
shall impose this level of productivity as a condition to be fulfilled for the rest of the period 
under consideration. 
2) We assume that employment figures are biased because of the labor market distortions 
originating in the systemic features of CPE. The main distortion consists in over-employment 
inside enterprises. We consider two types of over-employment: one type is inherited from the 
past and pertains during the period before the bulk of privatization is completed, e.g., since 
1990 and after; the second type is derived from labor hoarding and lower labor utilization as 
29 The data for employment in industry in Figure 26 are not consistent with the data in 
Figure 24 because of a different classification. The difference does not alter the conclusions 
of the analysis. 
30 The data for Figures 27 - 29 contains Table 10 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 26 Production and Employment in Industry 
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Figure 27 Productivity in Industry 
a consequence of output decline and emerges only with output decline, e.g., starting in 1991 
and after. We make three alternative estimates - A, B, and C. We choose 0 percent of the 
first type of over-employment and 0 percent of the second type of over-employment [version 
A] which is in fact no adjustment; then, 5 percent of the former (for 1990) and 7 percent of 
the latter (from 1991 onwards) [version B]; and 10 percent and 12 percent [version C] 
respectively . 
The estimates of potential output are then given by formulas: 
PO, = LP' . E',/100 [5al 
POB = LP' . E',/100 
PO, = LP' . E'J100, where [5cI 
LP' is labor productivity adjusted = average labor productivity for 1990 (quarterly data) 
E',, E',, and E', stand for employment adjusted - versions A, B, and C, being 
E', = 0 for the period 1990-1993142 
E',,, = E, . 0.95 for 1990 and 
E', ,, = E ,, . 0.88 for 199 1-1993142 
E', , = E, . 0.9 for 1990 and 
E', ,,,, = E ,, . 0.78 for 1991-1993142 
The visualization of the moving averages (three periods) of alternative estimates of potential 
output in industry are shown in Figure 28 (see Table 1OA in the Appendix). We can recognize 
a steady decline of potential output during the whole period with accelerated decline through 
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Figure 28 Potential Output in Industry 
the fourth quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 1991. Except the fourth quarter of 1990 
the trajectory of actual output (dotted line) moves within the range of three estimates. The 
excess from the end of 1990 could be explained by the enormous effort of enterprises to 
produce as much as possible in order to obtain high revenues from sales after price 
liberalization. Otherwise we see, that the higher the over-employment in enterprises, the lower 
the output-gap. In other words, if the labor conditions were "tight" since the very beginning 
(version A), a substantial output-gap emerged providing low inflationary pressures, other 
things being equal. If, on the other hand, the over-employment was significant already in 1990 
(version C), the economy was "overheated" in the first five quarters of the period and the 
output decline brings the economy to neutral inflationary impacts, ceteris paribus. In any case, 
under the conditions 1 and 2 above, we can talk about the decline of potential output in 
industry within the range of 30-35 percentage points on June 19931June 1990 basis. The 
output gap in industry, according to version B (as the middle estimate), is shown in Figure 
29. Above the dotted line, the output gap is negative indicating that the industry used its 
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Figure 29 Output-gap in Industry 
Table 4 Estimation of the Potential Output Decline, June 1990 to June 1993 
share of estimated change coefficient 
Branch actual output of potential of the 
in GDP in output in a change [11~[31 
199 la' branch - 
111 121 131 141 
- 
Industry 54.6 - 30-35% 0.675 36.86 
Agriculture 4.9 - 15% 0.850 4.17 
Construction 6.3 + 5%b) 1.050 6.62 
Transport 4.0 + 5%" 1.050 4.20 
Other 30.2 0% 1.000 30.20 
Total 100.0 - - 82.05 
Notes: 
a) Although actual output figures, by a definition, do not reflect the levels of utilization of 
production factors they are used as the best available approximation of the output share of 
selected branches in total GDP. 
b) Increase of potential output is assumed because of better organization of work implied by 
privatization. 
c) Increase of potential output is assumed because of modernization of some means of transport 
in private companies. Simultaneous deep decrease of actual output and slight increase of estimat- 
ed potential output in construction and transport indicate a high output gap in these branches. 
resources more than fully. However, starting with the first quarter of 199 1, industry slipped 
into a protracted period when production resources are not used by the amount of 10 
percentage points. 
If we "guesstimate" the decline of potential output in agriculture by 15 percent and 
some small increases in construction and transportation with all the other sectors remaining 
on approximately the same level, we may arrive at the decrease of potential output for the 
whole economy by about 16-20 percent on June 1993lJune 1990 basis (see Table 4). 
These results allow us to return to the basic question expressed in Figure 1 whether potential 
output shifted or not during transformation period in the Czech Republic and if so, to what 
extent and what was the relation between this shift and the evolution of actual output. The 
summary is given by Figure 30 where we assume that the level of potential output was 
350 370 390 41 0 430 450 470 490 51 0 530 
real GDP (bln. CSK - 1984 prices) 
Figure 30 Shift of Potential Output in the Czech Republic, 1990-1993 
Y*1993 
equal to the level of actual output in 1990. While these were in real terms 510 bil. CSK on 
annual basis (1984 prices) in 1990 the level of potential output declined to 418 bil. CSK 
and the level of actual output declined to 402 bil. CSK in 1993 implying 3.8% GDP-gap in 
this year. 
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Less obvious than the preceding analysis is the penetration into the concept of systemic- 
conditioned potential output. Though it largely refers to an anecdotal evidence, or to the 
phenomena which are difficult to quantify and measure we should make the concept at least 
partly operational. 
Generally, the disappearance of the systemic-conditioned potential output is based on 
the fading-out andlor reversal of those features which defined the substance of a centrally 
planned economy, e.g., soft, non-parametric and isolated environment. The more omnipresent 
the market-conform features will be the higher level of potential output should be attained 
ceteris paribus. Thus, the transformation entails: 
1) Changes of incentives derived from changed rules of the game. We can assume that less 
and less energy of managers will be devoted to a subjection of the external environment to 
the goals of a given enterprise and more effort will be directed to the compliance with 
customers' demand.3' Therefore, the level of capital utilization and utilization of labor and 
working time will not be driven by the incentives to maintain the necessary reserves vis-2-vis 
plan and the danger of its eventual non-fulfillment but rather vis-2-vis sudden upsurge of the 
demand, which, if not met, would mean a loss of potential (and very real) profit. 
2 )  Improvement in coordination of economic activities. The synergy effect of the introduction 
of the market system consists in the replacement of over-bureaucratic, tardy, and inefficient 
allocation and distribution of resources by a more flexible and swift one. The unproductive 
use of resources and very high coordination cost of the former economic system are supposed 
to be stopped and decreased respectively. 
3) Release of creative activities of population. Although the transformation process shows 
many deficiencies, attrition, and inefficiencies, there is much evidence that people have 
incomparably bigger space for their self-realization than before. Whether it is derived from 
their wishes, selfish interests, or dictated by the necessity to survive in a competitive 
environment is not much relevant here. One of the most striking phenomena in a short period 
of transition is that people, typically, become busy and spend (and use) time in another way 
than before.32 It can be assumed that the opportunity costs of many leisure-related activities 
became suddenly very high so that the whole layers of more qualified persons started their 
engagement in business-related activities. This rather massive adjustment constitutes an 
important quasi-productive factor which can augment the level of potential output ceteris 
paribus. 
4) Increase of welfare gains. Notwithstanding, this point does not allude directly to the 
production capabilities, it deals with a consumer's side of the economy. As a matter of fact 
consumer patterns under centrally planned economies were largely determined by forced 
substitution bringing the lower level of consumer's satisfaction. Under such circumstances the 
potential output basket of goods did not generate such a welfare that would be generated by 
31 This is not typically a case in enterprises which find themselves in a "privatization 
agony". Before completion of reasonable and satisfactory privatization, the managers usually 
continue paying extremely high attention to external factors other than demand and disregard 
the internal efficiency of the company. Patchy evidence even indicate that in order to attain 
the favorable position during the preparation of privatization, managers manipulate in 
sophisticated ways the reported (and inescapably also real) performance of the enterprise 
causing thus the transitory deterioration of the efficiency. 
32 Anecdotal evidence suggests the rocket rise of people's complaint about general and 
increasing "lack" of time. Many people are engaged in multiple activities, they do not have 
time to visit and meet each other, to spend a calm weekend at weekend houses or to read 
books, etc. 
a potential output basket without the forced substitution. To say it in other words, market- 
driven potential output has a higher value (in terms of consumer satisfaction) than the same 
level of potential output created under CPE ceteris paribus. If CPEs produced about 10 
percent of the gross social product which went "straight into inventories never to re-appear" 
(Winiecki, 1991), market provides with a wider choice of socially desirable goods. 
The strong proposition should be made that the main driving force behind the 
convergence of systemic-conditioned potential output towards economic potential output is 
the process of marketization and privatization of the economy supplemented by the world- 
market conform economic restructuring. The main contours of these goals may be achieved 
within 5-8 years since the beginning of transition. Indeed, many observations lead us to 
suggest that the gap between systemic-conditioned potential output and economic potential 
output already started closing; in other words, "y-efficiency" started to creep up at least in 
some segments of the economy. As one indication could serve increasing shares of GDP 
produced in private sector (see Table 6A in the Appendix). 
Abrupt changes on a quarter-to-quarter basis must not lead us to the conclusion that 
the efficiency and productivity of private sector production proceeds at the same pace. While 
some remarkable productivity gains may be seen in small private firms which started from 
scratch, those big firms (which simply received the tag "private" after the distribution of 
property rights to inexperienced funds or to thousands of privatization voucher owners) will 
struggle with their own inertia and behavioral patterns inherited from the past displaying not 
really spectacular improvements. Indeed, more detailed information could be fruitfully 
received from market research-, microeconomic-, and sociological studies. 
If we combine the concept of systemic conditioned potential output presented in 
section 5.2 with analysis of this section we have to conclude that three versions of potential 
output refer (at least in 1990) not to economic potential output but rather to systemic 
conditioned potential output. With the progress in marketization and privatization the potential 
output path will be more and more market-driven and will loose the conditionality derived 
from the logic of functioning of the former economic system. In the process, the dynamism 
of economic growth will be gaining the components which could be hardly attributed to a 
traditional growth accounting unless some necessary adjustments will be made. These should 
take into account for example: 1) newly emerging incentives to work and incentives to the 
better use available scarce production resources; 2) the synergy effects resulting from the 
better functioning of the markets; 3) benefits from the higher utility of consumers; etc. 
9. Policy Implications 
The above analysis indicates the implications for economic policy-making. Basically we may 
define two areas of policy activities. The first area is the standard macroeconomic policies 
(monetary, fiscal) which are potent enough to stabilize the economy and manipulate some 
relevant economic variables from "inside" the system. These exogenous variables refer mostly 
to a sort of tools like money supply, interest rates, government expenditures, or marginal tax 
rates. 
On the other hand, the second area consists of system-constituting, legislative, 
institutional, and microeconomic measures which are only marginally influenceable by 
macroeconomic policies. Here we have in mind the social network which generates the broad 
range of political and economic expectations, which minimizes risks of undertaking socially 
desirable investments, which leads individuals to believe in their future, which build up a 
respectable legal framework supporting the smooth and non-distortionary enforcement of 
contracts, which alleviate some externalities, which provide more efficiently agreeable public 
goods, which creates condition for sustainable growth, etc. All these factors can be seen as 
"independent" variables enter the economic system from "outside", need a medium-run for 
their implementation and only bring benefits in the long-run. While the former group basically 
influences the economic concept of potential output, the latter group deals predominantly with 
systemic-conditioned potential output. And most importantly, while the role of the former 
group policies in generating economic growth is very limited, the role of the factors from the 
second group is essential. 
If our assumptions and conclusions from the analysis done in the previous section 
were correct, the lesson for policy makers is that some limited dosage of expansionary 
policies would not have led to a danger of inflation in 1991 and the first half of 1992 because 
the aggregated production resources of the economy were far from being fully utilized 
according to western standards. Indeed, for a better recognition of possible bottlenecks in 
utilization of resources in individual branches, mezzo-economic analysis would need to be 
done. 
10. Conclusions 
Our excursion into the issue of potential output in a transitional economy suggests that the 
analysis is extremely burdensome and tricky. One firm spot on which we could stay escapes 
our skills of its more precise identification. Many circumstances indicate that this task will 
be more successfully fulfilled only after a fully-fledged market economy "settles down" and 
numerous uncertainties especially on the supply side stop clouding the magnifying lens of 
researchers. 
Nevertheless, some benefits of the above attempt could be traced. We found out that 
the economic processes in an economy in transition are too discontinuous to be suitable for 
the application of refined tools developed for market economies. Especially the condition of 
non-inflationary utilization of resources looses its applicability because inflation is generated 
by completely different factors than those stemming from tight utilization of resources. 
Similarly, unemployment cannot serve as a benchmark due to high labor participation and 
strong over-employment inherited from the past. Some insights and useful explanations could 
be received from the simultaneous assessment of different variables like inventories, profits, 
investment, foreign trade and direct measures related to the utilization of production 
equipment although they are much more difficult to obtain from existing statistical data. 
Rather important seems to be the data on employment despite the hesitant labor shedding 
practiced during extended privatization agony makes the analysis sometimes uncertain. A big 
unknown factor remains the long-term impact of the existing exchange rate on competitive- 
ness of individual sectors. Although the exchange rate is not an independent variable, the 
discretion in its setting by the central bank can have profound impacts both on the absolute 
level of potential output and on its structure. The empirical evidence accumulated during the 
transition period seems to suggest that the restructuring of the economy does not necessarily 
follow the patterns of comparative advantages (either perceived or real). A useful method- 
ological tool seems to be the introduction of a kind of transformation bridge between the 
centrally planned economy and a full-fledged market economy (a systemic-conditioned 
potential output). Though its operationalization is rather difficult, because it escapes the field 
of standard economic analysis, it helps to discern the tasks which are relevant for traditional 
macroeconomic policies from the goals which stand for widely based microeconomic policies 
and institutional restructuring. 
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Appendix - Statistical Data 

Table 2A Hypothesis about the impact of actual output, employment, net investment, and capacity utilization on potential 
output 
actual 
output 
(sold) 
hypothesis 
lements of observable variables I on the 
behavior of 
potential 
output: 
off-setting ? 
hypotheses on movements B,C,D 
and other movements 
used capacities are used more efficiently 
efficiency of production and investment decreases 
efficiency of investment decreases 
efficiency of investment increases 
efficiency of production capacities decreases 
if B or D, then output-neutral 
efficiency of production capacities increases 
efficiency of production and investment decreases 
efficiency of investment decreases 
if output & util. decrease equally, invest. = output- 
neutr. 
efficiency of production decreases 11 
efficiency of production decreases 
if output & util. decrease equally, prod. eff. is 
steady 11 
I 
Notes: 
1) Explanation of signs: + growth; 0 steady state; - decline. 
2) We do not assume the decline of net investment. 
3) Actual output in constant prices, capacity utilization in %. 
4) Typology of movements: 
A - shift of the whole production possibility frontier (ppf); 
B - movement along the ppf on the ppf; 
C - movement inside the ppf (towards to- and away from ppf); 
D - movement along the ppf inside the ppf. 
5) t-1: previous quarter. 
6) Off-setting: Some variables move in opposite directions; the resulting movement depends on which influence is stronger. 
7) Typically we assume no change of potential output but indicate the off-setting situation in parentheses. 
8) Employment: to simplify we assume either increase or decrease only. 








